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ABSTRACT
The agitation for resource control in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has frequently snowballed into 
violence and militancy. Although the demand for resource control borders on the transfer of owner-
ship and management and control of the processes of exploitation of crude oil found abundantly in 
the region, the exact parametres of the demand are not deined by the agitators. This paper examined 
the various variants of resource control demanded by the different groups of agitators in the Niger 
Delta. It particularly argued that the common law private property ownership principles of Cuius est 
solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, and Quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit be adopted to 
transfer ownership of natural resources, including crude oil to the indigenous inhabitants of the oil 
rich Niger Delta region in line with the principles of true federalism. The paper recommended the 
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restructure of the Nigerian federal system to devolve more powers to the states and repeal of certain 
existing laws that inhibit the rights of the people to own land and natural resources beneath those 
lands, which belong to them, their ancestors and children yet unborn.
Keywords: resource control; private property; ownership; common law; oil; Niger Delta
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is Africa’s leading oil producer with a production capacity of 2.2 million 
barrels (350,000 m3) per day.1 Its oil reserves are estimated to be as much as 37.0 
billion barrels.2 This oil resource is largely concentrated within the Niger Delta 
region of the country, which alone accounts for almost 95% of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings, about 65% of her budgetary revenues, 83% of her national 
wealth, and 80% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).3
Despite the enormous wealth this product has given to Nigeria, it has also 
fuelled the divisive politics of exclusion, which centres on the questions of who 
owns or should own the product, how surface access to production sites should 
be facilitated, in terms of ownership of land resources, and the deleterious effect 
of production on the lives of the people. The controversies these questions have 
generated are exacerbated by the enactment of several legislations that have con-
tributed to the sustenance of the instability in the Niger Delta region. Some of these 
legislations include provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, the Petroleum Act,4 the Oil Pipelines Act,5 the Oil in Navigable Waters 
Act,6 and the Land Use Act.7
In this paper, we intend to scrupulously analyse and re-visit the issue of own-
ership of both natural resources entrapped beneath the land and land itself within 
the Nigerian context, which is the fulcrum of the endless agitation and instability 
in the Niger Delta. We view the issue of ownership from the common law theories 
of ownership, Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,8 and Quic 
1 See OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, Nigeria Facts and Figures, 2015, www.opec.org/
opec_web/static_iles_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pdf [access: 3.04.2021]. 
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 Petroleum Act 1969 (Now Cap. P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria LFN, 2004).
5 Oil Pipelines Act 1956 (Now Cap. O7 LFN 2004).
6 Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 (Now Cap. O6 LFN 2004).
7 Land Use Act 1978 (Now Cap. L5 LFN 2004).
8 “To whom belong the soil it is his, even to Heaven, and to the middle of the earth”, loosely 
translated to mean that “the owner of the land is the owner of everything built upon the land and 
everything below the surface”.
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quid plantatur solo, solo cedit,9 to anchor our argument for a populist notion of 
ownership of nature’s wealth and equitable distribution of resources in Nigeria.
Our analysis of the question of “ownership” of both oil resources and land is 
synchronised under two perspectives. First, it raises the question of who owns (or 
should own) these resources between the federal and state governments of the Ni-
ger Delta region. Second, it raises the same question as to the ownership of these 
resources between either the federal government or state governments of the region 
and the people (inhabitants of the region). Part two of this paper explains the Niger 
Delta environment, the prevalence and volume of oil exploration in the region and 
the beneits such exploitation has brought to the Nigerian nation over the period 
from independence up until now. Part three deals with the issue of the Niger Delta 
people and agitations for resource control progressively over the years. Part four 
delves into the crux of our argument for the interpretation of ownership of oil and 
gas from a common law perspective, using the theories of Cuius est solum, eius 
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos and Quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit. Part 
ive is the conclusions.
THE NIGER DELTA, CRUDE OIL EXPLORATION 
AND THE NIGERIAN STATE
The Niger Delta is located in the southernmost region of Nigeria. It makes up 
7.5% of the Nigerian land mass, traversing over 70,000 km square.10 The area is 
bounded in the south by the Atlantic Ocean and the Republic of Cameroon, in the 
west by Ogun, Oyo and Kogi States, in the north by Ebonyi, Enugu, Anambra, Be-
nue and Kogi States, and in the east by Benue State and the Republic of Cameroon. 
The Niger Delta is made up of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta Edo, 
Imo, Ondo and Rivers states.11 The population of the area is estimated to be above 
31 million people, accounting for over 23% of Nigeria’s total population.12 The 
region is made up of more than 40 ethnic groups, with about 250 different dialects, 
amongst which Eik, Ibibio, Annang, Oron, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba, 
9 Meaning that “the owner of the land is the owner of everything built upon or afixed to the 
land”.
10 I. Okonta, O. Douglas, Where the Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Right and Oil, London 2003, 
p. 18.
11 Ibidem. See also V.T. Jike, Environmental Degradation, Social Disequilibrium, and the Di-
lemma of Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, “Journal of Black Studies” 2004, 
vol. 34(5), pp. 686–701.
12 See Niger Delta, www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/niger_delta [access: 8.11.2021].
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Bini and Kalabari are the major ethnic groups.13 The region is blessed with one of 
the inest ecosystems in the world, the highest concentrations of biodiversity on 
earth.14 It is comprised of numerous lora and fauna, with a viable arable plane that 
is a citadel of agricultural activities.15 The ecological zone is predominantly low-
land rainforest, mangrove swamp forests, freshwater swamps, and coastal barrier 
islands.16 The inhabitants are mainly ishers and farmers.
Above all the other attributes alluded to the Niger Delta region is the fact that 
it is the treasure base of the nation, and houses 60% of Nigeria’s total oil ields, 
which represents the country’s oil ields that are basically on-shore.17 This region has 
since 1960 when Nigeria gained political independence from the colonial masters 
remained the lifeline of the country’s economy as a result of Nigeria’s progressive 
gravitation towards a single commodity market in crude oil. Though, oil was irst 
discovered in Nigeria, in the then Southern Protectorate, in the year 1908 by the 
Nigerian Bitumen Company (a German company), it was not until 1956 that the 
irst discovery of the commodity in commercial quantity was made.18 Before this 
time, Nigeria had an agrarian economy.19 In 1960, for instance, Nigeria was the 
world’s highest exporter of cocoa, the country had a viable agro-economy spanning 
from the groundnut pyramids, beans and millet of the north and cocoa, oil palm, 
coal and ish of the south.20
However, despite the huge prospects of the country to diversify its economy 
after the discovery of crude oil, it is argued that the advent of the petroleum indus-
try actually dwindled the fortunes of Nigeria.21 This is indeed a classic case of the 
13 I. Okonta, O. Douglas, op. cit., p. 10. See also U. Etiosa, A. Matthew, Coping with Climate 
Change and Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta of Southern Nigeria, Community Research 
and Development Centre Nigeria (CREDC) Nigeria 2007, no. 6.
14 O.A. Asimea, A. Aigbe, The Impact of Oil and Gas Exploitation on Forestry Resources in the 
Niger Delta, [in:] Book of Reading in Forestry, Wildlife Management and Fisheries, eds. A.A Aiyeloja, 
H.M. Ijeoma, Lagos 2011, p. 133.
15 J.S. Omotola, The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension in 
the Niger Delta, 2006, www.accord.org.za/publication/the-next-gulf [access: 5.04.2021], pp. 3–31.
16 N. Zabbey, B.B. Babatunde, Overview of Environmental Pollution and Toxicology, [in:] Book 
of Reading in Forestry…, p. 110.
17 See F.O. Fagbohun, Dividends of Democracy of the Rural Population: The Case of the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria, [in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria, ed. V. Ojakorotu, Delray 
Beach 2009, p. 208.
18 See Amnesty International, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, 
Index: AFR 44/017/2009, www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/44000/afr440172009en.pdf [ac-
cess: 5.04.2021], p. 11.
19 See T. Mogues, Agricultural Public Spending in Nigeria, Washington 2008, https://ebrary.
ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/13441 [access: 4.04.2021].
20 Ibidem.
21 See A. Onduku, The Lingering Crisis in the Niger Delta: Field Work Report, 2001, 
http://52.31.122.192/library/ind-materials/journal-of-peace-conlict-and-development/NIger-Delta.
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curse associated with massive oil production by a country.22 Apart from neglecting 
other viable sectors of the economy to concentrate solely on oil revenues, it is also 
suggested that the oil industry actually heralded and has continued to sustain the 
monumental administrative and political decadence, which have persistently stunted 
growth in the country and clogged the wheels of development.23
Today, the entire Niger Delta land mass is inundated with oil ields, covering 
over 1,500 communities in the region, which account for at least three-quarters 
of Nigeria’s oil production.24 This has turned in billions of dollars to the Nigerian 
state over the period since independence in 1960.25 Currently, it is estimated that 
about 2 million barrels of crude oil are pumped out of the Niger Delta each day,26 
giving the government between the US $ 20–100 million daily.27 Shell Petroleum 
alone has about 159 oil ields and 275 low stations carved out of the fragile Delta 
ecosystem.28 The total number of oil wells drilled in the region is estimated to be 
over 5,000, representing about 31,000 km² of physical land.29
The over-dependence on oil production in Nigeria has resulted in the dominance 
of the product as the central commodity in the Nigerian economy, providing over 
80% of government revenues, 90% of foreign exchange earnings, and 40% of GDP. 
Thus, oil revenues are central to the functioning, growth and development of every 
facet of the Nigerian nation. Indeed, every major stride Nigeria has made since the 
pdf [access: 5.04.2021], p. 3. See also A. Mahler, Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? 
Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta, GIGA Research Programme (Violence & Security) 
Working Paper 2010, no. 120, p. 5; ANEEJ, Oil of Poverty in the Niger-Delta, A publication of the 
African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, 2004, p. 14.
22 See Amnesty International, Nigeria…, p. 9.
23 R.M. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, 
London 1993. See also J. Sachs, A. Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources, “European Economic 
Review” 2001, vol. 45(4–6), pp. 827–838.
24 See I. Okonta, O. Douglas, op. cit.
25 See H.T. Ejibunu, Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes of Peacelessness, “EPU Research 
Papers” 2007, no. 7, p. 6; International Crisis Group, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa Re-
port no. 113, 19.07.2006, p. 1; G. Wurthmann, Ways of Using the African Oil Boom for Sustainable De-
velopment, 2006, www.afdb.org/ileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/00806226-EN-ER-
WP-84.PDF [access: 9.03.2021].
26 See G.M. Bubou, A.C. Brent, C. Tredoux, Towards Assessing The Social Sustainability Per-
formance of the Petroleum Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, “South African Journal of 
Industrial Engineering” 2009, vol. 20(1), p. 119.
27 See A. Onduku, op. cit., p.3.
28 See T. O’Neill, Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta, 2007, www.
daniellazar.com/wp-content/uploads/the-curse-of-black-gold.doc [access: 3.03.2021].
29 See Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, with Federal Min-
istry of Environment (Abuja), Niger Delta Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration 
Project Scoping Report, 2006, www.iucn.org/sites/dev/iles/import/downloads/niger_delta_natural_re-
source_damage_assessment_and_restoration_project_recommendation.doc [access: 4.04.2021].
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1970s is tied to the revenue accruing from oil.30 However, despite the beneits of 
crude oil production, the region that produces it remains the most backward in the 
country,31 and the inhabitants live in abject poverty.32 The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) describes the region as suffering from “administrative 
neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social 
deprivation, abject poverty, ilth and squalor, and endemic conlict”.33 Majority of 
people in the Niger Delta have no access to clean water or health care;34 indeed, that 
the poverty in the region contrasts with the wealth generated by oil in the country, 
has become one of the world’s starkest example of the “resource curse”.35 According 
to T. Makgabo, Cable Network News (CNN) anchorman for “Inside Africa” 2007, 
the Niger Delta “is a region where time seems to have stood still and where people 
live the most meager of existences, leaving them bitter and angry from not having 
beneited from the black gold that makes Nigeria Africa’s largest producer”.36
The fact that the people of the Niger Delta have not beneited from oil wealth is 
only one part of the story. The second and most unfortunate part is the deleterious 
effect the exploitation of crude oil has had on people’s wellbeing. Widespread and 
unchecked activities related to the oil industry have pushed many people in the Niger 
Delta deeper into poverty and deprivation, fuelled conlict and led to a pervasive sense 
of powerlessness and frustration. The multi-dimensional crisis is driven by the actions 
of the security forces and militant groups, extensive pollution of land and water, 
corruption, corporate failures and bad practice, and serious government neglect.37
For the people of the Niger Delta, environmental quality and sustainability are 
fundamental to their overall wellbeing and development. According to UNDP, more 
than 60% of the people in the region depend on the natural environment for their live-
lihood.38 For many, the environmental resource base, which they use for agriculture, 
ishing and the collection of forest products, is their principal or sole source of food.39 
Pollution and environmental damage, therefore, pose signiicant risks to their survival 
30 See A. Mahler, op. cit., p. 14. See also O. Ajiboye, J. Jawando, W. Adisa, Poverty, oil explo-
ration and Niger Delta crisis: The response of the youth, “African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations” 2009, vol. 3(5), p. 224.
31 See G.M. Bubou, A.C. Brent, C. Tredoux, op. cit., p. 120.
32 See H.T. Ejibunu, op. cit., pp. 11–12.
33 United Nations Development Programme, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/iles/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf [access: 3.04.2021].
34 Ibidem.
35 See Amnesty International, Nigeria…, p. 9.
36 T. Makgabo, CNN, Inside Africa: Current Events on the Africa Continent, 2004, http://edition.
cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/02/i_if.01.html [access: 5.04.2021].
37 Amnesty International, Nigeria…, p. 9.
38 United Nations Development Programme, op. cit., p. 74.
39 Ibidem.
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and basic human rights.40 According to a study carried out by a team of Nigerian and 
international environmental experts in 2006,41 the Niger Delta is “one of the world’s 
most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems”. They stated: “The damage from oil 
and gas operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other 
sources of environmental stress to result in a severely impaired coastal ecosystem 
and compromised livelihoods and health of the regions impoverished residents”.
While oil spills and gas laring are the most frequently referenced forms of 
oil-related pollution in the Niger Delta, there are in fact several other ways in which 
the oil industry has continued to harm the environment, such as disposal of wastes 
and efluents, dredging, drilling, and seismic activities.42
THE NIGER-DELTA AGITATION FOR RESOURCE CONTROL
Having considered the physical state of the Niger Delta region, it is worth to note 
that the monumental backwardness, poverty, and especially government policies 
and attitude towards the region have laid the groundwork for popular agitations for 
economic autonomy, which sometimes lead to sporadic armed conlicts and other 
forms of violence. Apart from the excessive poverty and deleterious activities asso-
ciated with oil exploitation discussed above, several other important explanations 
are given for the unrest and volatility in the Niger Delta. For instance, unemploy-
ment is a major concern in the region, which has had a tremendous and adverse 
impact on peace and stability.43 As a result of poor management of the oil industry, 
especially the downstream sector,44 the entire industry employs only 35,000 people 
directly or indirectly,45 of which less than 5% are inhabitants of the Niger Delta.46
40 Ibidem.
41 Nigerian Conservation Foundation, op. cit.
42 See A. Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case against 
Gas Flaring in Nigeria, [in:] Adjudicating Climate Change: Sub-National, National, and Suprana-
tional Approaches, eds. W.C.G. Burns, H.M. Osofsky, Cambridge 2008, p. 3; T. O’Neill, op. cit.; 
D. Farah, Nigeria’s Oil Exploitation Leaves Delta Poor, Poisoned, “Washington Post” 2001, A22 
(March 18). See also I. Okonta, O. Douglas, op. cit., pp. 61–63; The Climate Justice Programme & 
Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, 
Environmental, and Economic Monstrosity, 2005, www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.laring/report/gas.
laring.in.nigeria.html [access: 10.11.2021].
43 See H.T. Ejibunu, op. cit., p. 16.
44 Energy Administration Information, Country Analysis Briefs – Nigeria, www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf [access: 5.11.2021], p. 4.
45 See Amnesty International, Oil in the Niger Delta, www.amnesty.org/pages/nga-031105-
action-eng [access: 15.11.2009].
46 E. Hutchful, Oil Companies and Environmental Pollution in Nigeria, [in:] Political Economy 
of Nigeria, ed. C. Ake, London 1985. See E. Kaniye, Niger Delta Oil, Development and the New 
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Another source of frustration and therefore agitation by the Niger Delta peo-
ple is the progressive reduction of revenue allocated to the region from crude oil 
production since independence.47 It is noted that the percentage of oil revenues 
refunded to the producing regions was almost 100% between 1953 and 1959.48 
The 1960 Constitution pegged it at 50%,49 which was in place until 1970 when the 
Gowon administration reduced it to 30%.50 Subsequently, the Aboyade Technical 
Committee during the Murtala/Obasanjo administration reduced the amount re-
fundable by 5%, the Shagari administration by 20%, and under the Buhari military 
government, derivation was as low as 1.5%.51 In fact, some writers speculate that 
derivation actually hit an all-time low of 0% before the Babangida administration 
ixed it at 1% and later increased it to 3%, where it remained until the coming into 
effect of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.52 Under the 
present Nigerian Constitution, 13% of revenue accruing to the federal government 
from oil produced from any state of the federation is to be paid back to it.53
To add salt to injury of the dwindling revenue from oil resources to the Niger 
Delta was the expropriation of their lands by the government, which not only deined 
their lives and culture, but also was a source of wealth.54 As far as the people of the 
region were concerned, ownership of land bequeaths everything associated with 
it, including natural resources found therein.55 Indeed, this accounts for the coop-
eration they gave to the Nigerian government and Multinational Oil Corporations 
(MNOCs) prior to the promulgation of the Land Use Decree 1978 notwithstanding 
the statutory ownership of natural resources by the state. Their participation in the 
process of management and control of land was suficient interest in the exploitation 
Development Initiative: Some Relections from a Socio-Legal Perspective, “Journal of Asian and 
African Studies” 2008, vol. 43(2), pp. 300–303.
47 A. Mahler, op. cit., p. 16.
48 See A.E. Ogbuigwe, The Law and Environment: The Niger Delta Challenge, “Port Harcourt 
Law Journal” 1999, vol. 4, p. 94.
49 Section 134 of the 1960 Constitution. See also Section 140 of the 1963 Republican Consti-
tution.
50 See Decree no. 13 of 1970. See generally H.P. Faga, Taming the Tiger in the Niger Delta; The 
Role of Law in the Niger Delta Question: Whither?, “Akungba Law Journal” 2008, vol. 1(2), p. 306.
51 See The Niger Delta: Phoenix of Nigerian Democracy, Vanguard Book Series, “Vanguard 
Newspaper” 2000 (January 22), p. 27.
52 See A.E. Ogbuigwe, op. cit., p. 94. See also United Nations Development Programme, op. cit.
53 Section 162 of the 1999 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as 
amended 2011, Cap. C.23 LFN 2004, hereinafter: CFRN.
54 Traditionally, land is spiritually and structurally interwoven with the lives of the people of the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. See E. Kaniye, Oil and the Niger Delta People: The Injustice of the 
Land Use Act, “Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy Journal” 2001, vol. 9, p. 9.
55 Ibidem.
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of crude oil to fulil the aspirations of environmental justice.56 In other words, even 
though the ownership of the oil was vested absolutely in the federal government, 
the communities owned the land beneath which the resources were situated and 
therefore reserved several beneicial rights, among which was the right to negotiate 
directly with oil companies concerning land use issues, such as rent, lease, tenure 
and compensation.57 The Act is described as the “most dramatic of the barrage of 
pro-oil statutes”.58
A critical look at the pattern of agitation in the Niger Delta reveals a tripodal 
trajectory. First, there is the agitation by independent federating units (states)59 in 
the region against the federal government in what is popularly known as the struggle 
for “resource control”. Second, there is agitation by the people of the region against 
the federal government and its oil interest in the region, which is expressed in the 
form of militancy, often elevated to a small scale war (insurgency) with sundry acts 
of sabotage, guerrilla tactics, asymmetric methods and demand for self-determina-
tion. Third, there is agitation by the people of the region against MNOCs operating 
in the region for environmental justice and protection of their human rights and 
livelihood, which has transcended national remedial enforcement methods. In this 
section, we shall consider the irst and second levels of agitation, which are indeed 
inseparable, although conceptually, each presents a unique pattern of agitation.
The struggle of the Niger Delta region for “resource control” began with the 
unsuccessful attempt in 1966 by Isaac Adaka Boro to secede from Nigeria and 
form the Niger Delta Republic.60 Ever since the rebellion was crushed, the attitude 
of every successive campaign of agitation in the region has shifted from the bid 
to acquire sovereignty and political independence, to seeking internal economic 
autonomy and participatory self-determination.61 This can be gleaned from the 
56 See A. Obiora, Symbolic episodes in the quest for environmental justice, “Human Rights 
Quarterly” 1991, vol. 21(2), p. 466, 477. See also G. Mbamalu, C. Mbamalu, D. Durett, Environmental 
Justice Issues in Developing Countries and in the Niger Delta, Paper delivered at the International 
Conference on Infrastructure Development and the Environment, Abuja, Nigeria, 10–15 September 
2006, p. 5.
57 R.T. Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice, “Journal of 
African Law” 2009, vol. 53(2), p. 301.
58 See K. Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conlict and Security in Nigeria, Durham–
London 2006, p. 47.
59 The Niger Delta states, comprised of Rivers state, Delta state, Belyesa state, Edo state, Abia 
state, Ondo state, Akwa Ibom state, Imo state and Cross Rivers state.
60 See generally I. Okonta, O. Douglas, op. cit., p. 10 (the main objective of the rebellion was 
to excise the region from Nigeria; secession).
61 A. Ako, The Struggle for Resource Control and Violence in the Niger Delta, [in:] Oil and 
Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, eds. C. Obi, 
S. Rustad, London 2, p. 46. See also R.T. Ako, O. Omiunu, Amnesty in the Niger Delta: Vertical 
Movement Towards Self-determination or Lateral, pp. 86–99.
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creed/charter declaration of all the major ethnic afiliations in the region.62 For 
instance, the Kaiama Declaration made by the Ijaw nation in 1998 states: “All 
lands and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory 
belong to the Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival. […] We cease to 
recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right 
to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without 
our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree, 1978 and the 
Petroleum Decree of 1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting, etc.) Decree no. 52 
of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree), the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree 
no 13 of 1997, etc.”.63
Thus, at the forefront of the struggle for resource control, are the people of 
the Niger Delta, signiied by the large participation of the ordinary Deltans in the 
various ethnic afiliates that adopted the declarations.64 However, the resource 
control agenda was later hijacked by the elites/elders and local/state authorities in 
the region, thereby raising the agitation to a more legalistic and constitutional issue, 
albeit with a substantially altered agenda.65 The problem with the resource control 
argument is the lack of clarity regarding the meaning and nature of the phrase. The 
people of the Niger Delta through the various declarations have expressed their 
understanding of the phrase to mean that all natural resources, including land and 
minerals found on the land or beneath it, must be totally controlled and managed by 
the people themselves or the communities in whose land the resources originate.66 
For instance, a former governor in one of the Niger Delta states gave his notion of 
resource control when he stated thus: “Resource control means that if I as a Bini 
man goes to Kebbi state and inds gold, the resource should belong to me and not 
the state or the federal government. All I owed the federal government is to pay 
taxes and royalties. The same principle should apply if a Kano man comes to Edo, 
62 See Ogoni Bill of Rights, www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html [access: 
6.01.2009]. See also the Akaka Declaration of the Egi People, the Oron Bill of Rights (1999), the 
Warri Accord, Resolutions of the First Urhorobo Economic Summit (1998), the Ikwerre Charter of 
Demand, the Demands of the First Niger Delta Indigenous Women’s Conference (1999) and the 
manifesto of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), the Niger Delta Community Defence Law 
Foundation (CD-LF). See generally H.T. Ejibunu, op. cit., p. 10–11.
63 Kaiama Declaration, 11 December 1998, http://ijawcenter.com/kaiama_declaration.html [ac-
cess: 9.10.2010].
64 See C. Obi, Youth and the Generational Dimensions to Struggles for Resource Control in the 
Niger Delta: Prospects for the Nation-state Project in Nigeria, 2006, www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/
Cyril_Obi.pdf [access: 4.03.2021], p. 30.
65 See O. Douglas, A Community Guide to Understanding Resource Control, 2001, www.waado.
org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/Guide_Douglas.html [access: 4.04.2021]; B. Joel, Niger Delta 
Youths Dump Resource Control, “Sunday Punch Newspaper” 2000 (February 24).
66 O. Douglas, op. cit.
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Delta or Bayelsa and strikes oil. He only pays royalties and taxes to the state or 
the federal government”.67
Indeed, one of the founding fathers of the country, Chief Obafemi Awolowo had 
commented that “the beneit of resource control should accrue to the individuals 
and not the state, following the principles enunciated by Adams Smith in the Wealth 
of Nations”.68 Thus, the struggle for resource control, which began as a populist 
movement for reconstruction of the polity became hijacked by the political elite 
after 1999 turning the momentum into a constitutional periphery-centre struggle 
for devolution of political and economic power, autonomy and true federalism.69 In 
the heat of the struggle, the governors of the south-south zone (Niger Delta states) 
met and deined the boundaries of what they meant by “resource control” as: “The 
practice of true federalism and natural law, in which the federating units express 
their right to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and make 
agreed contributions towards maintenance of common services of sovereign na-
tion-state in which they belong. In the case of Nigeria, the federating units are the 
36 states and the sovereign nation is the Federal Republic of Nigeria”.70
At the level of periphery-centre struggle for resource control, the irst issue 
attacked by the governors of the Niger Delta federating units was the so-called 
onshore/offshore dichotomy as basis for calculating the 13% derivation principle 
provided in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.71 The 1999 
Constitution unlike the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions of the country, failed to stip-
ulate the criteria for application of the derivation principle provided under it.72 
67 The governor was Lucky Igbinedion of Edo state. See D. Dainone, Resource Control: The 
Economic and Political Dimension, 2001, www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/dai-
none.html [access: 5.04.2021].
68 Ibidem. See also X. Salai-i-Marta, A. Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: 
An Illustration from Nigeria, “IMF Working Paper” 2003, no. 03/139.
69 See E.E. Osaghae, A. Ikelegbe, O.O. Olarinmoye, S.I. Okhomina, Youths Militias, Self De-
termination and Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-delta Region of Nigeria, Dakar 2011; 
O. Douglas, Discussion, [in:] The Niger Delta Question, ed. T.N. Tamuno, Port Harcourt 1999, 
p. 66. See also A. Utuama, The Niger Delta Crisis: The Legal Dimension, [in:] Fresh Dimensions 
in the Niger Delta Crisis…, pp. 19–20; idem, Challenges of Democracy and the Rule of Law, www.
nigerdeltacongress.org (access: 21.08.2010].
70 E.M. Ojameruaye, Quo vadis (Oil) Resource Control in the Niger Delta?, 2010, www.waado.
org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/ojameruaye.htm [access: 21.02.2021].
71 The derivation principle is provided in Section 162 (2) of the Constitution. It provides: “[…] 
the president […] shall table before the National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the 
federation account, and in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, 
the allocation principles especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, 
land mass, terrain as well as population density; provided that the principle of derivation shall be 
constantly relected in any approved formula as being not less than 13% of the revenue accruing to 
the federation account directly from any natural resources”.
72 See Section 134 (6) and Section 140 (6) of the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions respectively.
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Under these past Constitutions, the derivation principle was calculated to include 
revenue derived from the continental shelf contiguous to each particular region 
where oil was produced.73 Thus, such offshore territories were deemed to belong to 
the territory of the region (now states) for the purpose of calculating the derivation 
principle. This helped to put substantial funds in the hands of the regions at that 
time. However, because of the non-inclusion of such similar clause in the 1999 
Constitution, derivation was initially calculated based on only natural resources 
derived from onshore territories of the oil producing states. Thus, as a result of 
the very high reliance on offshore oil production in Nigeria since 1999, derivation 
based on such dichotomy led to an abysmal reduction in the revenue base of the 
Niger Delta states, effectively reducing the derivation principle to only 8% of the 
original 13% provided in the Constitution.74
Following agitation by states of the Niger Delta for a larger share of federal 
funds through the derivation principle, the Federal Government instituted an action 
against the federating states in the Supreme Court of Nigeria to determine the sea-
ward boundaries of littoral states in the country, in order to determine if they were 
entitled to revenue derived offshore from oil production. The Supreme Court in 
the case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State 
and 35 Others75 (Resource Control case) inally declared that the littoral states 
(including the Niger Delta states) had no claims to resources within the continental 
shelf of the country.76 This decision further aggravated the agitation and contributed 
to the initial increase in violence and restlessness in the Niger Delta region, as the 
communities that are affected by the effect of oil production (whether onshore or 
offshore) regarded this as another assault on their right to self-determination and 
control of their natural resources.77 At this stage, a political resolution of the impasse 
became imperative to assuage the discontent of the littoral states, and eventually, 
the National Assembly enacted the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy 
in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act 2004, which inally laid that 
phase of agitation to rest.78
73 See H.P. Faga, op. cit., p. 308.
74 See E.M. Ojameruaye, op. cit.
75 (2002) FWLR [Pt. 102] 85.
76 Ibidem, per Ogundare JSC 91-97.
77 See H.O. Yusuf, Oil on troubled Waters: Multinational Corporations and Realising Human 
Rights in the Developing World, with Speciic Reference to Nigeria, “African Human Rights Law 
Journal” 2008, vol. 8(1), p. 88.
78 Section 1 (2) of the Act (Act no. A89, 2004) provides that “as from the commencement of 
this Act, the 200 metre water depth isobaths contiguous to a state of the federation shall be deemed 
to be part of that state for the purpose of calculating the revenue accruing to the federation account 
from the state pursuant to the provisions of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 
or any other enactment”. See E.M. Ojameruaye, The Off-Shore/On-Shore Oil Dichotomy Abolition 
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The next phase of the periphery-centre struggle for resource control was the 
thunderous outcry for the convention of a Sovereign National Conference that 
would bring together delegates from all ethnic nationalities in the country to agree 
on mutually beneicial terms of the union of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 
Niger Delta governors hoped that such a conference would recommend devolu-
tion of both political and economic power to the state governments and therefore 
realize their ultimate aim of achieving complete control and management of the 
oil sector. Despite the initial opposition and suspicion of the Federal Government 
towards the merit of such conference, it did a clever volte-face on the issue but 
instead convened what it called the National Political Reform Conference, with 
a substantially limited mandate.79 The delegates from the Niger Delta region laid 
their demands before the conference but were eventually made to abandon the hard 
stance for absolute control of the natural resources found in their territory, for the 
less favourable increase of the derivation principle.80 Thus, the initial demands of 
the Niger Delta states of 25% derivation principle with a progressive increase to 
50% in 5 years were utterly rejected by the conference, and rather a 17% derivation 
was recommended amongst other solutions, to tame further agitations from the 
region.81 Despite their protestation and dramatic walkout from the conference, it 
eventually concluded without them.82
It turned out that the National Political Reform Conference, just like earlier 
attempts by the federal government to address the Niger Delta question was a ruse, 
as recommendations of the conference were never implemented. Rather, the Oba-
sanjo administration continued its attacks against militants who had stepped up 
violence in the region as a direct consequence of the failure of the conference83 
and purportedly inaugurated the Council on Socio and Economic Development of 
Coastal States of the Niger Delta in early 2006. The Council was given a nine-point 
mandate, which never materialized until the tenure of the administration expired in 
2007.84 Under the then Yar’Adua/Goodluck administration, no signiicant attitudinal 
change was effected on the part of government with respect to agitations in the 
Act: Matters Arising, 2004, www.nigerdeltapeoplesworldcongress.org/articles/offshoreonshore_oil.
pdf [access: 5.04.2021].
79 The Conference had no mandate to substantially restructure the Nigerian polity by the adop-
tion of a new constitution. See S. Ofehe, Resource Control Set to Tear Nigeria Apart, 2005, https://
onlinenigeria.com/columnists/ad.php?blurb=110 [access: 4.03.2021].
80 E.M. Ojameruaye, Quo vadis…
81 See E. Amaize, Resource Control: Anger Everywhere, “Vanguard Newspaper (Nigeria)” 2005 
(July 3).
82 See R. Singer, The state of Nigerian democracy, 2006, http://dawodu.com/singer1.pdf [ access: 
18.06.2009].
83 See N.B. Najibo, B. Nwiline, Relative Deprivation and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta Region, [in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis…, p. 55, 88.
84 See E.M. Ojameruaye, Quo vadis…
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Niger Delta, except that a different approach was adopted. Though the government 
extended an olive leaf to the militants rather than matching their violence with state 
force,85 however instead of implementing the myriads of recommendations made 
by previous Commissions, it opted to establish the Niger Delta Technical Commit-
tee,86 which has turned out to be another subterfuge.87 The Amnesty programme of 
the administration has almost altogether collapsed88 and hostilities have resumed 
principally between Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
and the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in the region.89
It appears that notwithstanding the amnesty programme and the emergence of 
former President Goodluck as Nigeria’s president (being an indigene of the Niger 
Delta),90 the root causes of the Niger Delta agitation are yet to be addressed, and 
notwithstanding that the violence in the Niger Delta has subsided, the issue of 
resource control is yet to receive adequate attention.
Although much of our discussion so far has dwelled on the irst level of agitation 
between the federating units (states) in the Niger Delta region and the federal govern-
ment of Nigeria, the agitations have a signiicant correlation with the second level of 
struggle between the people of the Niger Delta region and the federal government. 
First, the agitation for resource control has always been a populist movement before 
the elites and state oficials in the Niger Delta hijacked it. Thus, the struggle has 
remained under the vigilant eyes and active participation of the people, especially 
the militant youths in the region who continued to reward positive progress and co-
operation, with relative calm and encumbrance or sabotage with violence. However, 
the populist notion of resource control held by the people is diametrically different 
from the elitist struggle. The people of the Niger Delta region have denounced claims 
of the various federating state governments to the proceeds of oil resources found 
85 Ibidem. See also C. Obi, S. Rustad, Conclusion: Amnesty and Post-Amnesty Peace, Is the 
Window of Opportunity Closing for the Niger Delta?, [in:] Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta…, 
p. 204.
86 E.M. Ojameruaye, Quo vadis…
87 See D. Kio-Lawson, J.B. Dekor, Militancy Crises and the Challenge of Rural Development 
in Post Amnesty Rivers State, Nigeria, “World Environment” 2014, vol. 4(1), pp. 33–41.
88 A. David, M.O. Uiem, Ethnic and Regional Violence in Nigeria: Implications for National 
Security, “Journal of Politics and Law” 2014, vol. 7(3).
89 See Jamestown Foundation, No End in Sight: Violence in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea, 
“Terrorism Monitor” 2013, vol. 11(5); IRIN, Analysis: Niger Delta still Unstable Despite Amnes-
ty, www.irinnews.org/report/94306/analysis-niger-delta-still-unstable-despite-amnesty [access: 
11.11.2015].
90 The former President Goodluck Jonathan is an indigene of Otuoke in Bayelsa State, which 
forms part of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria He served as Nigerian Vice President (May 29, 2007 
– February 9, 2010), Acting President (February 9, 2010 – May 5, 2010) and President (May 5, 2010 
– May 29, 2015). For biography of former President Jonathan see A. Mckenna, Goodluck Jonathan, 
[in:] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Goodluck Jonathan, 2015, www.britannica.com/biography/Good-
luck-Jonathan [access: 5.04.2021].
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beneath their lands due to the gross inability of states and local governments in the 
region to utilise funds accrued to the region from the derivation principle over the 
years for development and progress. There is evidence of serious mismanagement 
and misappropriation of these funds by government oficials in the region, which has 
stunted development and left the people in perpetual penury.91
According to some analysts, between 1999 and 2007 about NGN 3 trillion was 
allocated to the Niger Delta region either through the derivation principle or alloca-
tion to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).92 Even though a mas-
sive 70% and 22% of this fund went to states and local governments respectively, 
and only a paltry 8% went to the NDDC, nothing of signiicance was achieved in 
terms of execution of major project by these two arms of government put together, 
compared to the achievements of the NDDC within the period.93
It appears that the people of the Niger Delta do not agree with their elites, states 
and local governments in the region on what should deine the populist struggle for 
resource control in terms of the meaning of the phrase and who should eventually 
manage and control the vast oil reserves in the region if the struggle should succeed. 
There is evidence that the people’s notion of “resource control” is inextricably knit-
ted with their ancestral use and ownership of the lands beneath which the “black 
gold” is found. Thus, from a populist viewpoint, the struggle is classiied as a quest 
for “communitisation”94 rather than the venal attempt of the region’s political elite 
to perpetuate the status quo under the guise for enthronement of true federalism.
Notwithstanding, there is yet to be a deinite consensus amongst the people on 
how the demand for resource control should be implemented to guarantee the in-
volvement of the people in both the management and control of the vast oil reserves 
beneath their lands. For instance, E.M. Ojameruaye (himself from the Niger Delta 
region) supports the idea of “joint ownership” of crude oil resources in the Niger 
Delta, but opines that the mode of joint ownership should be restricted to the com-
munities alone.95 According to him, the joint ownership should be spread between 
the federal government, the mineral producing states/local governments, and the 
91 See generally I. Sagay, Ownership and Control of Nigerian Petroleum Resources: A Legal 
Angle, [in:] Nigerian Petroleum Business: A Handbook, ed. V.E. Eromosele, Lagos 1997, pp. 176–186. 
See also A. Otite, Niger Delta Ruling Elite and the Under-Development of the Niger Delta Region 
of Nigeria, [in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis…, pp. 164–167.
92 See N.B. Najibo, B. Nwiline, op. cit., p. 64. See also S. Omotola, op. cit.
93 N.B. Najibo, B. Nwiline, op. cit., p.65.
94 See the statement of Oronto Douglas, one of the signatories to the IYC Kaiama Declaration 
and deputy director of Environmental Rights Action (ERA) where he stated that “communitisation 
is the inal frontier in resource control advocacy and realization. It is based on community self-suf-
iciency and control in all matters relating to our communities and its ultimate aim is the reclaiming 
of the misappropriated resources and its return to communal rebuilding and repositioning agenda for 
our people”. See B. Joel, op. cit. See generally C. Obi, op. cit., p. 41.
95 See E.M. Ojameruaye, Quo vadis…
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communities where the resources are exploited, through the allocation of shares 
and equity holdings in mineral producing ventures.96 Other writers have contributed 
in shaping the debate on the nature of arrangement that would best express the 
character of resource control suitable for the people of the Niger Delta should the 
struggle succeed. F.O. Ayodele-Akaakar seems to favour the USA–Canada model 
for application in Nigeria, where a dual system of ownership exists in some states 
of the U.S. in which the landowner owns mineral rights of onshore areas while 
the states and the federal government own minerals in/on public lands including 
offshore areas.97 In Canada on the other hand, the provinces (states) have complete 
title to petroleum resources in situ on property within their territory while federal 
policy is only focused on the consumption and trade aspects of the oil industry.98
X. Salai-i-Marta and A. Subramanian on the other hand introduced an inter-
esting argument for an entirely new model of redistribution of oil wealth among 
citizens of the country rather than a strict resource control archetype for the Niger 
Delta.99 They believe that resource control may not after all be the solution to the 
increasing violence in the Niger Delta, but a more enduring model for redistribution 
of wealth, repair of environmental damage and provision for future generations.100
EXPLORING THE COMMON LAW PRIVATE PROPERTY PRINCIPLES IN 
THE NIGER DELTA QUESTION
Despite the clarity in Nigeria’s statute books on who owns petroleum on the one 
hand,101 and on the other hand, in who land is vested,102 the question of ownership 
and control of both crude oil and land remains a divisive factor in the Nigerian 
polity. Like most OPEC countries,103 Nigeria operates a centralised state owner-
96 Ibidem.
97 See F.O.Ayodele-Akaakar, Appraising the Oil & Gas Laws: A Search for Enduring Legis-
lation for the Niger Delta Region, “Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa” 2001, vol. 3(2), 
pp. 11–2. See also idem, Oil and Gas – the Issue of Ownership and the Nigerian Situation, “FJRSB 
(FIDA Journal)” 1999, no. 2, p. 61.
98 Ibidem.
99 X. Salai-i-Marta, A. Subramanian, op. cit., pp. 20–21.
100 Ibidem, pp. 19–20 (arguing that a permanent fund should be created by cutting back on the 
production capacity at a particular percentage, to cater for the needs of future generations and issues 
of environmental degradation).
101 See Section 44 (3) CFRN. See also South Atlantic Petroleum Ltd v. Minister of Petroleum 
Resources (2006) 10 CLRN 122. (Nigeria).
102 Section 1 (1) of the Land Use Act Cap. L6 LFN 2004.
103 See, e.g., Libya, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the Arab Gulf countries, Algeria and 
Angola. For more information on OPEC nations and their modes of oil ownership, visit www.opec.
org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm [access: 10.11.2021].
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ship of petroleum resources although this is not without criticism. Proponents of 
this model of ownership rely on the UN Resolution 1803 of 1962 (on permanent 
sovereignty of states over their natural resources) to argue that the federal gov-
ernment alone has the responsibility to ensure equitable distribution of oil wealth 
to all Nigerians. They argue that vesting ownership and control of oil resources 
in federating states would most certainly lead to the development of few strong 
states that may resort to intimidation of other federating states or even the federal 
government, which would threaten political and economic stability.104 On the need 
to ensure implementation of the World Bank’s operational policy on indigenous 
peoples’ connection to their land and natural resources, proponents of state owner-
ship argue that no particular ethnic group in the Niger Delta can claim indigeneity 
above others and therefore, the need to restructure the ownership pattern in their 
favour does not arise.105
Advocates of decentralised state ownership of oil resources, on the other hand, 
argue that Nigeria should adopt a mode of ownership that resonates with its so-
cio-political diversity and peculiarities as a nation. They refute the claims that fed-
eral ownership is needed to protect equal development of the country because, since 
independence in 1960, the central government has been controlled by one region, 
which has criminally neglected the Niger Delta that produces 80% of the nation’s 
wealth.106 They contend that the UN Resolution 1803 of 1962 did not prescribe any 
particular mode of ownership for nations, and that the resolution was concluded 
only to prevent external control of a state’s resources. They also embraced the 
report of the Working Group of Experts under the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Afri-
ca107 to argue for special treatment of the entire Niger Delta peoples as indigenous 
peoples notwithstanding their diverse tribal afiliations.108 Finally, they argue that 
diversiication of ownership is necessary to promote healthy competition among 
104 N. Usman, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Mineral Resource Development: Global 
Trends and the Nigerian Question, PhD Thesis, Dundee 2003, p. 142; A.I. Chukwuemerie, New 
Dimensions in Commercial and Oil and Gas Laws, Port Harcourt 2007, pp. 682–735.
105 Y. Omorogbe, Oil and Gas law in Nigeria, Lagos 2001, pp. 146–151.
106 See C. Nwapi, A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making 
in Nigeria, “Journal of African Law” 2009, vol. 54(2), pp. 184–211.
107 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the African Commission’s 
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, adopted by the African Commission 
at its 34th Ordinary Session, November 2003, www.iwgia.org/graphics/Synkron-Library/Documents/
publications/Downloadpublications/Books/AfricanCommissionbookEnglish.pdf [access: 19.09.2019].
108 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the African Commission’s 
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities. Adopted by the African Com-
mission at its 28th Ordinary Session, November 2005, www.iwgia.org/images/publications/Afri-
can_Commission_book.pdf [access: 5.04.2021]. Also to note that the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in the case of Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
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the various federating states in Nigeria109 and that centralised federal ownership 
has led to monumental corruption.110
These opposing views of centralised vs. decentralised state ownership of oil 
resources111 are tampered by a third perspective of private ownership, which is 
rooted in the common law private property ownership principles.112 Essentially, 
the state-ownership theory confers title in oil and gas on the state irrespective of 
who owns the land, whereas the private ownership theory (which is hinged on the 
principles of Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, and Quic 
quid plantatur solo, solo cedit), posits that “the owner of a tract of land acquires 
title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, although it 
may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands […] the 
owner of land under which oil and gas lie is the absolute owner of them in place 
in the same manner and to the same extent as is the owner of solid minerals”.113
D.T. Mailula argues that even in systems where the private ownership theory 
operates, the state owns oil and gas much like other private owners because it is only 
entitled to petroleum underneath State lands in the same way as individuals.114 This 
theory of ownership often referred to as “absolute ownership”, “Texas” or ad coelum 
theory, dates back to the Roman medieval era115 although it has been criticized in 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya (276/2003) recognised 
the right of indigenous people in Africa.
109 Ibidem.
110 Ibidem.
111 Centralised state ownership is practiced by countries like Nigeria, Libya, Venezuela, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the Arab Gulf countries, Algeria and Angola, while decentralised state ownership 
is found in the USA, Canada and Australia. See W.T. Onorato , J.J. Park, World Petroleum Legisla-
tion: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development, “Alberta Law Review” 2001, vol. 39(1), 
pp. 73–74.
112 This is obtainable in the states of Texas, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and 
South Dakota in the USA. See E.E. Smith, J.S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petro-
leum Arrangements, “Texas International Law Journal” 1989, vol. 24, p. 5. See also J.G. Sprankling, 
Owning the Center of the Earth, “UCLA Law Review” 2008, vol. 55(4), p. 1002; D.T. Mailula, Pro-
tection of Petroleum Resources in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Oil and Gas Laws of Selected 
African States, LL.D Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of South Africa, 2013, http://uir.unisa.ac.za/
bitstream/handle/10500/13610/DT%20Mailula%20LLD%20Thesis%20%27PROTECTION%20
OF%20PETROLEUM%20RESOURCES%20IN%20AFRICA%27.pdf%20-%20Adobe%20Acro-
bat%20Pro.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [access: 17.01.2021]., p. 33.
113 A. Al-Qasem, Principles of Petroleum Legislation: The Case of a Developing Country, London 
1985. See the case of Kankakee County Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 871 N.E.2d 38, 52 
(Ill. 2007), where the Supreme Court of Illinois, USA, held that “the owner in fee owns to the center of 
the earth”. See also the Supreme Court of Iowa in Orr v. Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007).
114 D.T. Mailula, op. cit.
115 See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, p. 18, as referred to in D.T. Mailula, 
op. cit., p. 34.
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modern times. The irst criticism hinges on the fact that petroleum is fugacious or 
migratory in nature and therefore, dificult to determine ownership in situ.116
The second loophole in this theory is the fact that petroleum is not only avail-
able onshore, but there is a large deposit of petroleum resources offshore (within 
the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones [EEZ] of nations) where no 
individual can claim ownership save a nation State.117 The third law has to do with 
the transposition of the limitation of ownership and control of the airspace (made 
possible by advances in technology), into ownership of subterranean resources 
(including hydrocarbon) owned by individuals.118 In the case of United States v. 
Causby, the US Supreme Court developed an exception to the ad coelum principle 
above the land surface when it held that “to recognize such private claims to the 
airspace would clog these highways, [and] seriously interfere with their control 
and development in the public interest”.119
In order to circumvent the lapses of the absolute ownership theory, the Supreme 
Court of the State of Pennsylvania in the US developed the qualiied ownership 
theory in the case of Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt120 when 
it held that oil and natural gas were much like “fugitive wild animals”. Thus, “just 
as a wild animal cannot be owned by an individual until it has been captured, pe-
troleum cannot be owned by any person until he has captured it” under the private 
ownership rule of capture.121 In 2008, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld the theory 
in the case of Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust122 when it reasoned 
that the rule “gives a mineral rights owner title to the oil and gas produced from 
a lawful well bottomed on his property, even if the oil and gas lowed to the well 
from beneath another owner’s tract. The rule of capture is a cornerstone of the oil 
and gas industry and is fundamental both to property rights and to state regulation”.
In order to determine the most appropriate person or institution entitled to 
ownership of oil resources in Nigeria, it is imperative irst to determine who ac-
tually owns land in the real operation of law in Nigeria. This would enable us to 
apply the common law principles of Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et 
116 Ibidem.
117 See Parts 5 and 6 of UNCLOS 1982 (on the EEZ and Continental Shelves). See also the case 
of Attorney-General of Federal of Nigeria v. Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors. [2002] 6 NWLR 
(Pt. 764) 542.
118 See J.G. Sprankling, op. cit., p. 1022, 1029.
119 United States v. Causby 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
120 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
121 See D.T. Mailula, op. cit., p. 35. See also N. Ely, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and 
Gas: A Symposium Source, “Harvard Law Review” 1940, vol. 53(6), pp. 1070–1074, 1071; H. Lau-
terpacht, International Law Reports, Cambridge 1989, p. 814; T. Riley, Wrangling with Urban 
Wildcatters: Defending Texas Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances against Regulatory 
Takings Challenges, “Vermont Law Review” 2007, vol. 3(2), p. 351.
122 05-0466 (Tex. 8-29-2008) as cited in D.T. Mailula, op. cit.
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ad inferos123 and Quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit124 to resolve the problem of 
ownership. Indeed, at common law, land is made up of the surface of the soil or the 
earth surface, including everything naturally growing or attached to the surface, 
everything inside the sub-soil, the air space above the soil, and things artiicially 
attached to the soil.125 These common law principles have been judicially recog-
nized as established principles of Nigerian land law by the Supreme Court, in the 
celebrated case of Otogbolu v. Okeluwa.126 Thus, there is a presumption at com-
mon law that a landowner also owns all minerals on or beneath the surface of that 
land,127 with the only exception of royal metal (silver and gold) situate on public or 
private land, which is regarded as the property of the crown.128 Individual owners 
of land retained their ownership of mineral resources (petroleum inclusive) under 
the common law doctrine (save for the Royal metals).129 According to W. Black-
stone: “Whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land and the centre 
of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface as is every day’s experience in the 
mining countries. So that the word ‘land’ includes not only the face of the earth, 
but everything under it, or over it”.130
These common law principles were brought into Nigeria as part of the received 
English law. Section 18 (1) of the Interpretation Act of 1945,131 imported the com-
mon law meaning of land in Nigeria. The section deines land as the earth’s surface 
and everything attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything that is 
attached to the earth and all chattels real.
The lawyer’s question, therefore, is who the actual owner of land in Nigeria is. 
The nearest statutory answer remains section 1 of the Land Use Act 1978 (LUA)132 
that provides thus “subject to the provisions of this Act, all lands comprised in the 
territory of each state of the federation are hereby vested in the Governor of the 
State and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common 
beneit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this Act”.
By virtue of this provision, state governors now hold all land within the territory 
of each state of the federation in trust for the beneit of all Nigerians. It, therefore, 
123 Loosely translated to mean that “the owner of the land is the owner of everything built upon 
the land and everything below the surface”.
124 Meaning that “the owner of the land is the owner of everything built upon or afixed to the 
land”.
125 A.J. Bradbrook, The Relevance of the Cujus est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner’s 
Claims to Natural Resources Located above and Beneath the Land, “Adel. L.R.” 1988, no. 11, p. 464.
126 (1981) 6-8 S.C. 99 at 146.
127 A.I. Chukwuemerie, op. cit.
128 R. v. Earl of Northumberland (Case of Mines) (1568) 1 Plowden 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472.
129 M.W. Hunt, Mining Law in Western Australia, Lechhardt 2001, p. 34.
130 W. Blackstone, An Analysis of the Laws of England, Oxford 1756.
131 Cap. I23 LFN 2004.
132 Cap. L6 LFN 2004.
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means that the trustee (in this case, the governor) has the right to manage, control 
and use the trust property against all persons except the beneiciary. It equally 
means that the right of management and control is bestowed on him, as legal own-
er on behalf of the equitable owner.133 When section 1 LUA is read together with 
section 44 (3) of the 1999 CFRN (as amended), which vests ownership of mineral 
resources on the federal government, the contradiction is absolutely clear: land is 
vested in the state governor, while mineral resources found therein is vested in the 
federal government. According to G. Angaye, “the logic that one owns the land and 
another owns the oil extracted from beneath the land is Nigerian logic or illogic 
propounded by parochial logicians. If crude were found under ‘the big tree’ eminent 
jurists would have inserted the enabling section in the 1999 Constitution to read 
‘any oil found under any big tree belongs exclusively to the owner of a big tree”.134
There is no doubt that this system runs contrary to the principles of Cuius est 
solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos and Quicquid platatur solo, solo 
credit.135 It is also against the principle of true federalism, which requires the feder-
ating units to control their natural resources.136 On the strength of these principles, it 
is highly illogical to provide that one owns land and another owns the thing buried 
inside, as section 1 LUA and section 44 (3) of the 1999 CFRN has purportedly done.
Going by the natural order of the owner of land claiming not only surface rights 
but also the right to the sub-soil and its riches, it would certainly be logical to ar-
gue that federating states in Nigeria should have the right to ownership of natural 
resources by virtue of all lands being vested in state governors. This disposition 
may, however, run a serious risk of fallacy because the wordings of section 1 LUA 
did not confer absolute ownership of lands in the territory of federating states on 
the governor but such land is vested in him only as a trustee. Although under the 
133 I. Abdulkarim, Trust Law and the Administration of Real Property in Nigeria, “International 
Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance” 2011, vol. 2(1), p. 229.
134 G. Angaye, Who Owns Papa’s Land and Oil in Nigeria?, 2002, www.nigerDeltacongress.
com/garticles/who_owns_papas_land_and_oil [access: 5.04.2021].
135 Note that we are not ignorant of the purport of Section 45 of the Interpretation Act 1945 which 
is to the effect that all Received English Laws (Common Law inclusive) are subject to local circum-
stances and enactment, and such local enactment may “expressly repeal or by implication render such 
English Law impotent”. See Salubi v. Nwariaku (2003) 20 W.R.N. 53. Per Ayoola, J.S.C. at 66. See 
also J.O. Asein, Introduction to Nigerian Legal System, Lagos 2005, p. 112. It therefore connotes 
that where an English Law is in conlict with an existing Statute or Statutes, such English law is void 
to the extent of its inconsistency. See Section (1) of CFRN; INEC v. Musa (2003) 10 W.R.N. 1 per 
Ayoola, J.S.C., pp. 40–41; Momoh v. Senate of the National Assembly (1981) 1 N.C.L.R. 21. However, 
our contention is that Nigerian Laws on ownership of Petroleum and Land use have threatened the 
survivor of the Nigerian state and have failed to meet the human security of Nigeria. It has worked 
more hardship on the Niger Delta people than good, hence our call for a reversal of the status quo.
136 E. Eko, Towards the Review of the Land Use Act, Land Use Policy and Administration, 2004, 
as cited in K.O.N. Onu, A Critical Appraisal of the Legal Regime of Ownership of Petroleum and 
Land use in Nigeria, LL.B Project, Faculty of Law, Ebonyi State University, 2010, p. 50.
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common law, the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property while the bene-
iciary is the equitable owner, the nature of the trustee’s ownership is limited to 
possession, management and control, which does not confer absolute ownership 
in personam.137 There is no doubt that the true owners of trustee property remain 
the beneiciaries and in this case, the valid holders of right of occupancy, espe-
cially those claiming as aborigines on the land.138 The LUA does not dispossess 
the aborigines of their ancestral lands, but only confers a cosmetic right of trustee 
on the governor by deeming all prior owners of land as holders of valid right of 
occupancy with all the pre-existing powers of ownership except the radical title 
and the power of the governor to acquire land for public purposes.139 Thus, for all 
intent and purposes, the LUA does not deprive individual landholders of the use 
of their lands, although as beneiciary of a trustee, the individual landholder may 
no longer deal with the land as he wishes without the approval of the trustee.140 
Certainly, the interest of beneicial individual landholders is not subservient to the 
trustee, but instead operates more like a co-owner of the land.141
Despite the consequences of divesting the radical title in land from the individ-
ual, family or community owners,142 if the ad coelum principles were to apply in 
determining who owns the natural resources beneath the land, both the individual 
landholder and the state government may lay equal claim to ownership as a result 
of the trust created by the LUA. This potentially diminishes the quest to ind the 
owner of land as a precursor to resolving the resource control debacle in the event 
of a successful campaign against the federal government (by creating a trust in 
the land tenure system, the LUA further convolutes who the true owner of land is 
in Nigeria). Although it appears that the resolution of the resource control debate 
depends more on determining the ownership question (irst, ownership of land and 
137 See I. Sandor, The Legal Institution of the Trust in the Economy and Law of Eastern European 
Countries, “European Scientiic Journal” 2005, vol. 11(10), pp. 141–142.
138 J.F. Fekumo, Does Land Use Act Expropriate? – A Rejoinder, “Journal of Private & Property 
Law” 1988, vol. 8/9, pp. 15–18; T. Otubu, Land Reforms and the Future of Land Use Act in Nigeria, 
“Nigerian Current Law Review” 2010, vol. 3, pp. 139–140.
139 See sections 34 and 36 LUA; T. Otubu, op. cit., p. 136–137; I.O. Smith, Practical Approach 
to Law of Real Property in Nigeria, Lagos 1999, pp. 70–71. See also A. Otubu, The Land Use Act 
and Land Administration in 21st Century Nigeria: Need for Reform, “Afe Babalola Univ. J. Sust. 
Dev. & Pol’y” 2018, vol. 9(1), pp. 99–100; O. Duru, Nationalization, Expropriation or Coniscation: 
A Critical Overview of the Pro and Contra Arguments Regarding the Effect of the Land Use Act on 
Land in Nigeria, 2012, www.ssrn.com/abstract=2157273 [access: 25.09.2019].
140 See sections 21 and 22 LUA. See alsoJ.S. Omotala, Does the Land Use Act Expropriate?, 
“Journal of Private & Property Law” 1985, vol. 3, p. 6; A.K. Otubu, The Land Use Act and Land 
Ownership Debate in Nigeria: Resolving the Impasse, “Ife Law Juris Review” 2015, vol. 3, pp. 14–18.
141 A.A. Utuama, Nigerian Law of Real Property, Lagos 2012, pp. 264–265; S.A. Osamolu, 
O.T. Oduwole, C.O. Oba, Real Property Law and Conveyancing Practice in Nigeria, Abuja 2008, p. 82.
142 A.K. Otubu, op. cit., p. 14.
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second, ownership of oil), the matter may indeed be resolved without necessarily 
constructing the argument around “ownership”. Ultimately, it is immaterial who 
owns natural resources (including crude oil and land) if the management and control 
of the processes of exploitation of resources are spread among the stakeholders: the 
federal government, the federating state governments, and the aboriginal individual, 
family or community landholders. The agitation for resource control is more about 
meaningful participation of the inhabitants of oil-producing areas in the exploitation 
processes that guarantee a good livelihood and healthy environment than it is about 
ownership of crude oil simpliciter.143
In this regard, Nigeria could borrow a cue from the Canadian system where 
federating regional governments own the bulk of crude oil produced in Canada, 
except offshore oil reserves, which the federal government owns.144 However, oil 
found in designated aboriginal lands belongs to the aborigine population who decide 
for themselves how to exploit it.145 Still, the federal government controls exclusive-
ly regulation of the entire oil and gas industry, involving pipelines or power lines 
that cross provincial or international boundaries, tolls and tariffs, environmental 
standards and the import and export of energy.146 A similar arrangement could work 
in Nigeria where the federal government owns all crude oil and natural resources 
in Nigeria while the federating state governments and the aborigine communities, 
families and individuals share ownership of all lands in the country, so that the latter 
is fully integrated in all decisions regarding exploitation on their lands.
The current level of participation of the aboriginal communities, families and 
individuals allowed by the extant laws in the exploitation of crude oil in Nigeria 
is abysmally low to satisfy international human rights standards and the desire of 
the inhabitants of oil-producing areas to share in the development process as stake-
holders. The constitutional 13% derivation principle regarding proceeds of crude 
oil required to be paid back to the governments of oil-producing states is certainly 
commendable but still falls short of the giant stride needed to ensure inclusion of 
the Niger Delta inhabitants (oil-producing region) in the exploitation of their natural 
resources. The derivation principle beneits those in government at the federating 
143 ILO/ACHPR, Nigeria: Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning 
Indigenous Peoples, Geneva 2009, pp. 18–22.
144 See A.L.C. de Mestra, Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related 
Areas and Reference Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, “Mcgill Law Journal” 1985, vol. 30, p. 293.
145 W. Hamley, Resource Development and Aboriginal Rights in the Canadian Northlands, “The 
London Journal of Canadian Studies” 1995, vol. 11, pp. 82–85; B. Gallagher, Resource Rulers: Fortune 
and Folly on Canada’s Road to Resources, Toronto 2012. See also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
146 See M.C. Moore, An Energy Strategy for Canada, 2015, www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/anenergystrategyforcanada.pdf [access: 5.04.2021]. See also W. Konaszczuk, Cyber-
security Threats in the Sectors of Oil, Natural Gas and Electric Power in the Context of Technological 
Evolution, “Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2021, vol. 30(4), p. 339.
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state level more than the inhabitants of the areas where crude oil is extracted who 
are most affected by the impact of exploitation. Thus, in order to address the second 
level of agitation for resource control involving militant activities of different youth 
groups in the Niger Delta against the federal government interest (oil installations) 
and multinational oil companies, what is needed is the commitment to implement 
internal self-determination.
To achieve this, section 44 (3) of the 1999 Constitution and section 1 of the 
Petroleum Act should be amended to relect the true meaning of the federalism 
which Nigerians want and also relect the meaning of the maxims Cuius est solum, 
eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, and Quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit. In 
essence, we recommend that Nigeria should adopt a hybrid ownership system in 
which the State (both federal and federating states) and individual landholders own 
petroleum resources in Nigeria. Whereas the federal government retains absolute 
ownership of offshore petroleum resources, onshore ownership should be based on 
ownership of land in situ. The government should levy taxes on revenue derived 
from onshore oil exploitation rather than take over the oil. Until this is done, we are 
still far from uhuru of restiveness and injustice in Nigeria. There cannot be peace 
in the midst of injustice. Do justice and peace will naturally low.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude by urging the government to look towards the jurisprudence of 
the common law private property ownership principle in resolving the Niger Delta 
issue. There can never be peace in the midst of injustice. F.C. von Savigny had 
noted that “the law grows with growth and strengthens with the strength of the 
people and inally dies away as the nation loses its nationality”.147
Nigeria must equally allow its laws to grow with the people. Since society 
is always forward-looking, the law as an instrument of social change should be 
progressive. The laws that deserve change as we recommended should, therefore, 
be changed. This is because some of them are now mere imposition, which cannot 
be sustained for so long in the face of popular quest for a change. The will of the 
people at the end will normally win over force however brutal it may be.
147 F.C. von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, 1831, http://
docenti.unimc.it/luigi.lacche/teaching/2018/18657/iles/texts-to-study-preparing-for-the-exam/Savi-
gny%20Of_the_vocation_of_our_age_for_legislati.pdf [access: 23.01.2021], p. 27.




The Niger Delta Agitation for Resource Control: Making Sense of Common Law… 247
REFERENCES
Literature
Abdulkarim I., Trust Law and the Administration of Real Property in Nigeria, “International Journal 
of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance” 2011, vol. 2(1).
Ajiboye O., Jawando J., Adisa W., Poverty, oil exploration and Niger Delta crisis: The response of 
the youth, “African Journal of Political Science and International Relations” 2009, vol. 3(5).
Ako A., The Struggle for Resource Control and Violence in the Niger Delta, [in:] Oil and Insurgency 
in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, eds. C. Obi, S. Rustad, 
London 2011.
Ako R.T., Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice, “Journal of African 
Law” 2009, vol. 53(2).
Ako R.T., Omiunu O., Amnesty in the Niger Delta: Vertical Movement Towards Self-determination 
or Lateral Policy Shift?, “Afe Babalola University: Journal of Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy” 2013, vol. 1(1).
Al-Qasem A., Principles of Petroleum Legislation: The Case of a Developing Country, London 1985.
Amaize E., Resource Control: Anger Everywhere, “Vanguard Newspaper (Nigeria)” 2005 (July 3).
ANEEJ, Oil of Poverty in the Niger-Delta, A publication of the African Network for Environmental 
and Economic Justice, 2004.
Asein J.O., Introduction to Nigerian Legal System, Lagos 2005.
Asimea O.A., Aigbe A., The Impact of Oil and Gas Exploitation on Forestry Resources in the Niger 
Delta, [in:] Book of Reading in Forestry, Wildlife Management and Fisheries, eds. A.A Aiyeloja, 
H.M. Ijeoma, Lagos 2011.
Auty R.M., Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis, London 1993.
Ayodele-Akaakar F.O., Appraising the Oil & Gas Laws: A Search for Enduring Legislation for the 
Niger Delta Region, “Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa” 2001, vol. 3(2).
Ayodele-Akaakar F.O., Oil and Gas – the Issue of Ownership and the Nigerian Situation, “FJRSB 
(FIDA Journal)” 1999, no. 2.
Blackstone W., An Analysis of the Laws of England, Oxford 1756.
Bradbrook A.J., The Relevance of the Cujus est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner’s Claims 
to Natural Resources Located above and Beneath the Land, “Adel. L.R.” 1988, no. 11.
Bubou G.M., Brent A.C., Tredoux C., Towards Assessing The Social Sustainability Performance of 
the Petroleum Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, “South African Journal of Industrial 
Engineering” 2009, vol. 20(1).
Chukwuemerie A.I., New Dimensions in Commercial and Oil and Gas Laws, Port Harcourt 2007.
David A., Uiem M.O., Ethnic and Regional Violence in Nigeria: Implications for National Security, 
“Journal of Politics and Law” 2014, vol. 7(3).
Douglas O., Discussion, [in:] The Niger Delta Question, ed. T.N. Tamuno, Port Harcourt 1999.
Ejibunu H.T., Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes of Peacelessness, “EPU Research Papers” 
2007, no. 7.
Ely N., Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Symposium Source, “Harvard Law Review” 
1940, vol. 53(6).
Etiosa U., Matthew A., Coping with Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in the Niger 
Delta of Southern Nigeria, Community Research and Development Centre Nigeria (CREDC) 
Nigeria 2007, no. 6.
Faga H.P., Taming the Tiger in the Niger Delta; The Role of Law in the Niger Delta Question: Whith-
er?, “Akungba Law Journal” 2008, vol. 1(2).




Hemen Philip Faga, Rita Abhavan Ngwoke248
Fagbohun F.O., Dividends of Democracy of the Rural Population: The Case of the Niger Delta in 
Nigeria, [in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria, ed. V. Ojakorotu, Delray 
Beach 2009.
Farah D., Nigeria’s Oil Exploitation Leaves Delta Poor, Poisoned, “Washington Post” 2001, A22 
(March 18).
Fekumo J.F., Does Land Use Act Expropriate? – A Rejoinder, “Journal of Private & Property Law” 
1988, vol. 8/9.
Foundation J., No End in Sight: Violence in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea, “Terrorism Monitor” 
2013, vol. 11(5).
Gallagher B., Resource Rulers: Fortune and Folly on Canada’s Road to Resources, Toronto 2012.
Hamley W., Resource Development and Aboriginal Rights in the Canadian Northlands, “The London 
Journal of Canadian Studies” 1995, vol. 11.
Hunt M.W., Mining Law in Western Australia, Lechhardt 2001.
Hutchful E., Oil Companies and Environmental Pollution in Nigeria, [in:] Political Economy of 
Nigeria, ed. C. Ake, London 1985.
ILO/ACHPR, Nigeria: Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning Indi- 
genous Peoples, Geneva 2009.
International Crisis Group, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa Report no. 113, 19.07.2006.
Jamestown Foundation, No End in Sight: Violence in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea, “Terrorism 
Monitor” 2013, vol. 11(5).
Jike V.T., Environmental Degradation, Social Disequilibrium, and the Dilemma of Sustainable De-
velopment in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, “Journal of Black Studies” 2004, vol. 34(5).
Joel B., Niger Delta Youths Dump Resource Control, “Sunday Punch Newspaper” 2000 (February 24).
Kaniye E., Niger Delta Oil, Development and the New Development Initiative: Some Relections 
from a Socio-Legal Perspective, “Journal of Asian and African Studies” 2008, vol. 43(2), DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909608091974.
Kaniye E., Oil and the Niger Delta People: The Injustice of the Land Use Act, “Centre for Energy, 
Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy Journal” 2001, vol. 9.
Kio-Lawson D., Dekor J.B., Militancy Crises and the Challenge of Rural Development in Post Am-
nesty Rivers State, Nigeria, “World Environment” 2014, vol. 4(1), 
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5923/j.env.20140401.04.
Konaszczuk W., Cybersecurity Threats in the Sectors of Oil, Natural Gas and Electric Power in the 
Context of Technological Evolution, “Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2021, vol. 30(4), 
 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/sil.2021.30.4.333-351.
Lauterpacht H., International Law Reports, Cambridge 1989.
Mahler A., Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the 
Niger Delta, GIGA Research Programme (Violence & Security) Working Paper 2010, no. 120.
Mbamalu G., Mbamalu C., Durett D., Environmental Justice Issues in Developing Countries and in 
the Niger Delta, Paper delivered at the International Conference on Infrastructure Development 
and the Environment, Abuja, Nigeria, 10–15 September 2006.
Mestral A.L.C. de, Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas and 
Reference Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, “Mcgill Law Journal” 1985, vol. 30.
Najibo N.B., Nwiline B., Relative Deprivation and Hostage-Taking in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region, 
[in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria, ed. V. Ojakorotu, Delray Beach 2009.
Nwapi C., A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in Nigeria, 
“Journal of African Law” 2009, vol. 54(2), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0021855310000045.
Obi C., Rustad S., Conclusion: Amnesty and Post-Amnesty Peace, Is the Window of Opportunity 
Closing for the Niger Delta?, [in:] Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex 
Politics of Petro-Violence, eds. C. Obi, S. Rustad, London 2011.




The Niger Delta Agitation for Resource Control: Making Sense of Common Law… 249
Obiora A., Symbolic episodes in the quest for environmental justice, “Human Rights Quarterly” 
1991, vol. 21(2).
Ogbuigwe A.E., The Law and Environment: The Niger Delta Challenge, “Port Harcourt Law Journal” 
1999, vol. 4.
Okonta I., Douglas O., Where the Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Right and Oil, London 2003.
Omeje K., High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conlict and Security in Nigeria, Durham–London 2006.
Omorogbe Y., Oil and Gas law in Nigeria, Lagos 2001.
Omotola J.S., Does the Land Use Act Expropriate?, “Journal of Private & Property Law” 1985, vol. 3.
Onorato W.T., Park J.J., World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas De-
velopment, “Alberta Law Review” 2001, vol. 39(1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.29173/alr509.
Onu K.O.N., A Critical Appraisal of the Legal Regime of Ownership of Petroleum and Land use in 
Nigeria, LL.B Project, Faculty of Law, Ebonyi State University, 2010.
Osaghae E.E., Ikelegbe A., Olarinmoye O.O., Okhomina S.I., Youths Militias, Self Determination and 
Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-delta Region of Nigeria, Dakar 2011.
Osamolu S.A., Oduwole O.T., Oba C.O., Real Property Law and Conveyancing Practice in Nigeria, 
Abuja 2008.
Otite A., Niger Delta Ruling Elite and the Under-Development of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 
[in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria, ed. V. Ojakorotu, Delray Beach 2009.
Otubu A., The Land Use Act and Land Administration in 21st Century Nigeria: Need for Reform, “Afe 
Babalola Univ. J. Sust. Dev. & Pol’y” 2018, vol. 9(1), 
 DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jsdlp.v9i1.5.
Otubu A.K., The Land Use Act and Land Ownership Debate in Nigeria: Resolving the Impasse, “Ife 
Law Juris Review” 2015, vol. 3.
Otubu T., Land Reforms and the Future of Land Use Act in Nigeria, “Nigerian Current Law Review” 
2010, vol. 3.
Riley T., Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas Municipal Oil and Gas Development 
Ordinances against Regulatory Takings Challenges, “Vermont Law Review” 2007, vol. 3(2).
Sachs J., Warner A., The Curse of Natural Resources, “European Economic Review” 2001, vol. 45(4–6).
Sagay I., Ownership and Control of Nigerian Petroleum Resources: A Legal Angle, [in:] Nigerian 
Petroleum Business: A Handbook, ed. V.E. Eromosele, Lagos 1997.
Salai-i-Marta X., Subramanian A., Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from 
Nigeria, “IMF Working Paper” 2003, no. 03/139.
Sandor I., The Legal Institution of the Trust in the Economy and Law of Eastern European Countries, 
“European Scientiic Journal” 2005, vol. 11(10), 
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2015.v11n10p%25p.
Sinden A., An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case against Gas Flar-
ing in Nigeria, [in:] Adjudicating Climate Change: Sub-National, National, and Supranational 
Approaches, eds. W.C.G. Burns, H.M. Osofsky, Cambridge 2008.
Smith E.E., Dzienkowski J.S., A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, “Texas 
International Law Journal” 1989, vol. 24.
Smith I.O., Practical Approach to Law of Real Property in Nigeria, Lagos 1999.
Sprankling J.G., Owning the Center of the Earth, “UCLA Law Review” 2008, vol. 55(4).
The Niger Delta: Phoenix of Nigerian Democracy, Vanguard Book Series, “Vanguard Newspaper” 
2000 (January 22).
Usman N., The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Mineral Resource Development: Global Trends 
and the Nigerian Question, PhD Thesis, Dundee 2003.
Utuama A., The Niger Delta Crisis: The Legal Dimension, [in:] Fresh Dimensions in the Niger Delta 
Crisis in Nigeria, ed. V. Ojakorotu, Delray Beach 2009.
Utuama A.A., Nigerian Law of Real Property, Lagos 2012.
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 10/01/2022 21:20:44
UM
Hemen Philip Faga, Rita Abhavan Ngwoke250
Yusuf H.O., Oil on troubled Waters: Multinational Corporations and Realising Human Rights in the 
Developing World, with Speciic Reference to Nigeria, “African Human Rights Law Journal” 
2008, vol. 8(1).
Zabbey N., Babatunde B.B., Overview of Environmental Pollution and Toxicology, [in:] Book of 
Reading in Forestry, Wildlife Management and Fisheries, eds. A.A. Aiyeloja, H.M. Ijeoma, 
Lagos 2011.
Online sources
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the African Commission’s Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities. Adopted by the African Commission 
at its 28th Ordinary Session, November 2005, www.iwgia.org/images/publications/African_Com-
mission_book.pdf [access: 5.04.2021].
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report of the African Commission’s Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, adopted by the African Commis-
sion at its 34th Ordinary Session, November 2003, www.iwgia.org/graphics/Synkron-Library/
Documents/publications/Downloadpublications/Books/AfricanCommissionbookEnglish.pdf 
[access: 19.09.2019].
Amnesty International, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Index: AFR 
44/017/2009, www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/44000/afr440172009en.pdf [access: 
5.04.2021].
Amnesty International, Oil in the Niger Delta, www.amnesty.org/pages/nga-031105-action-eng 
[access: 15.11.2009].
Angaye G., Who Owns Papa’s Land and Oil in Nigeria?, 2002, www.nigerDeltacongress.com/gar-
ticles/who_owns_papas_land_and_oil [access: 5.04.2021].
Dainone D., Resource Control: The Economic and Political Dimension, 2001, www.waado.org/
nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/dainone.html [access: 5.04.2021].
Douglas O., A Community Guide to Understanding Resource Control, 2001, www.waado.org/niger-
delta/essays/resourcecontrol/Guide_Douglas.html [access: 4.04.2021].
Duru O., Nationalization, Expropriation or Coniscation: A Critical Overview of the Pro and Contra 
Arguments Regarding the Effect of the Land Use Act on Land in Nigeria, 2012, www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2157273 [access: 25.09.2019].
Energy Administration Information, Country Analysis Briefs – Nigeria, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Nigeria/pdf.pdf [access: 5.11.2021].
IRIN, Analysis: Niger Delta still Unstable Despite Amnesty, www.irinnews.org/report/94306/analy-
sis-niger-delta-still-unstable-despite-amnesty [access: 11.11.2015].
Kaiama Declaration, 11 December 1998, http://ijawcenter.com/kaiama_declaration.html [access: 
9.10.2010].
Mailula D.T., Protection of Petroleum Resources in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Oil and Gas 




Makgabo T., Inside Africa: Current Events on the Africa Continent, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0410/02/i_if.01.html [access: 5.04.2021].
Mckenna A., Goodluck Jonathan, [in:] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Goodluck Jonathan, 2015, www.
britannica.com/biography/Goodluck-Jonathan [access: 5.04.2021].
Mogues T., Agricultural Public Spending in Nigeria, Washington 2008, https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/
collection/p15738coll2/id/13441 [access: 4.04.2021].




The Niger Delta Agitation for Resource Control: Making Sense of Common Law… 251
Moore M.C., An Energy Strategy for Canada, 2015, www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/03/anenergystrategyforcanada.pdf [access: 5.04.2021].
Niger Delta, www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/niger_delta [access: 8.11.2021].
Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, with Federal Ministry 
of Environment (Abuja), Niger Delta Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration 
Project Scoping Report, 2006, www.iucn.org/sites/dev/iles/import/downloads/niger_delta_
natural_resource_damage_assessment_and_restoration_project_recommendation.doc [access: 
4.04.2021].
O’Neill T., Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta, 2007, www.daniellazar.
com/wp-content/uploads/the-curse-of-black-gold.doc [access: 3.03.2021].
Obi C., Youth and the Generational Dimensions to Struggles for Resource Control in the Niger Delta: 
Prospects for the Nation-state Project in Nigeria, 2006, www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Cyril_Obi.
pdf [access: 4.03.2021].
Ofehe S., Resource Control Set to Tear Nigeria Apart, 2005, https://onlinenigeria.com/columnists/
ad.php?blurb=110 [access: 4.03.2021].
Ogoni Bill of Rights, www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html [access: 6.01.2009].
Ojameruaye E.M., Quo vadis (Oil) Resource Control in the Niger Delta?, 2010, www.waado.org/
nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/ojameruaye.htm [access: 21.02.2021].
Ojameruaye E.M., The Off-Shore/On-Shore Oil Dichotomy Abolition Act: Matters Arising, 2004, 
www.nigerdeltapeoplesworldcongress.org/articles/offshoreonshore_oil.pdf [access: 5.04.2021].
Omotola S., The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension in the Niger 
Delta, 2006, www.accord.org.za/publication/the-next-gulf [access: 5.04.2021].
Onduku A., The Lingering Crisis in the Niger Delta: Field Work Report, 2001, http://52.31.122.192/
library/ind-materials/journal-of-peace-conlict-and-development/NIger-Delta.pdf [access: 5.04.2021].
OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, Nigeria Facts and Figures, 2015, www.opec.org/opec_web/stat-
ic_iles_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pdf [access: 3.04.2021].
Savigny F.C. von, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, 1831, http://docenti.
unimc.it/luigi.lacche/teaching/2018/18657/iles/texts-to-study-preparing-for-the-exam/Savig-
ny%20Of_the_vocation_of_our_age_for_legislati.pdf [access: 23.01.2021].
Singer R., The state of Nigerian democracy, 2006, http://dawodu.com/singer1.pdf [ access: 18.06.2009].
The Climate Justice Programme & Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Gas 
Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental, and Economic Monstrosity, 2005, www.
climatelaw.org/media/gas.laring/report/gas.laring.in.nigeria.html [access: 10.11.2021].
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/iles/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf [access: 3.04.2021].
Utuama A., Challenges of Democracy and the Rule of Law, www.nigerdeltacongress.org (access: 
21.08.2010].




Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
Land Use Act 1978 (Now Cap. L5 LFN 2004).
Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 (Now Cap. O6 LFN 2004).
Oil Pipelines Act 1956 (Now Cap. O7 LFN 2004).
Petroleum Act 1969 (Now Cap. P10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria LFN, 2004).




Hemen Philip Faga, Rita Abhavan Ngwoke252
Case law
Attorney-General of Federal of Nigeria v. Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors. [2002] 6 NWLR 
(Pt. 764) 542.
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya (276/2003) (Kenya).
INEC v. Musa (2003) 10 W.R.N. 1 at 40–41.
Kankakee County Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 871 N.E.2d 38, 52 (Ill. 2007).
Orr v. Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007).
R. v. Earl of Northumberland (Case of Mines), (1568) 1 Plowden 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472.
Salubi v. Nwariaku (2003) 20 W.R.N. 53 at 66.
South Atlantic Petroleum Ltd v. Minister of Petroleum Resources (2006) 10 CLRN 122. (Nigeria).
United States v. Causby 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
ABSTRAKT
Agitacja na rzecz kontroli zasobów w regionie delty Nigru w Nigerii często przeradza się w prze-
moc i wojnę. Chociaż postulat kontroli zasobów łączy się z kwestiami przeniesienia własności oraz 
zarządzania i kontroli procesów wydobycia ropy naftowej występującej w dużych ilościach w regionie, 
dokładne parametry tych żądań nie zostały określone przez agitatorów. W niniejszym artykule analizie 
poddano różne warianty kontroli zasobów, której domagają się różne grupy agitatorów w delcie Ni-
gru. W szczególności podkreślono, że zasady dotyczące własności prywatnej, wynikające z common 
law: Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos oraz Quiquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, 
powinny zostać zastosowane do przenoszenia własności zasobów naturalnych, w tym ropy naftowej, 
na rdzennych mieszkańców bogatego w ropę regionu delty Nigru, zgodnie z zasadami prawdziwego 
federalizmu. Autorzy zalecają restrukturyzację nigeryjskiego systemu federalnego w kierunku prze-
kazania większych uprawnień stanom i uchylenia niektórych istniejących praw, które ograniczają 
prawa ludzi do własności ziemi i zasobów naturalnych znajdujących się pod powierzchnią gruntów 
należących do nich, ich przodków i jeszcze nienarodzonych dzieci.
Słowa kluczowe: kontrola zasobów; własność prywatna; własność; common law; ropa naftowa; 
delta Nigru
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